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Abstract 
 
In June 2010 the Spanish Constitutional Court rendered a very important judgment 
on the constitutional legitimacy of the new fundamental charter (Estatut) of the 
Autonomous Community of Catalonia. Faced with a very long and ambitious legal 
document, the Court succeeded in not condemning as illegitimate most of its controversial 
provisions by means of interpretation consistent with the Constitution. Thus, those 
provisions aiming at ‘constitutionalizing’ Catalan identity have been widely neutralized or 
deprived of their legal significance. By doing so, however, the Court has attracted 
widespread criticism, possibly paving the way for further conflicts 
 
Key-words:  
 
 Spanish Constitutional Court, Estatut of Catalonia, Subnational constitutionalism,  
Identity clauses, Constituent power, Fundamental rights. 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   N -   
 
3 
 
 1. Introductory Remarks 
  
On 28 June 2010 the Constitutional Court of Spain (Tribunal Constitucional, TC) 
rendered a much-waited judgment concerning the constitutional legitimacy of a great 
number of provisions of the new fundamental charter of the Autonomous Community of 
CataloniaI. The Estatuto de Autonomía (Estatut, in Catalan) was approved by the Parliament 
of Spain in 2006 and soon after confirmed by referendum on 18 June 2006. It has come 
into force, as ley orgánica no. 6/2006, on 9 August 2006. After that, the main opposition 
party, the right-wing Partido Popular, questioned the constitutional legitimacy of the new 
Catalan charter – almost in its entirety – before the TC. Six other complaints – concerning 
more specific points – were filed by the national ombudsman (Defensor del PuebloII) and five 
other Autonomous Communities (MurciaIII, La RiojaIV, AragonV, Valencian CommunityVI, 
and the Balearic IslandsVII). 
 The judgment of the TC can be seen as a milestone in European sub-national 
constitutionalismVIII. It is a wide-ranging analysis of one of the most significant outcomes 
of the recent wave of constitution-making in sub-national legal orders throughout Europe. 
Even if only some of the provisions of the Estatut were challenged before the TC, they 
were the most meaningful and controversial both from a political and symbolic viewpoint. 
Thus, the judges were inevitably ‘forced’ to develop a complete analysis of the whole text, 
its place within the Spanish system of sources of law, its relations with the Constitution of 
Spain, and the balance of power in the Spanish ‘autonomic State’ (Estado autonómico). Many 
questions which the TC had to face in this judgment and in other, less emotional previous 
decisions were similar to debates conducted in other European countries. It is easy to make 
comparisons between the arguments used by the TC and the Italian Constitutional Court in 
some ‘hard cases’ which have arisen during the ‘second wave’ of regional charter-making 
after 1999IX. The dramatic series of events which led to the publication of the judgment in 
Summer 2010 put into question the very legitimacy of the Spanish TC and, more broadly, 
the role of constitutional courts (and their fitness) in solving conflicts in federal or regional 
systemsX. 
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2. The New Estatut of  Catalonia 
The new Catalan Estatut has been widely regarded as the chief expression of the 
‘last wave’ of Estatutos de Autonomía in the Autonomous Communities of Spain (CAs)XI. 
The discussion on whether and how to revise their most important legal documents has 
concerned both Communities corresponding to ‘historical nationalities’ (nacionalidades 
históricas) and the other, ‘ordinary’ Communities. Because of the manifestly unconstitutional 
character and the subsequent breakdown of the so-called ‘Ibarretxe Plan’ for a new Basque 
charter, the Catalan Estatut rapidly turned into the cornerstone of the debate concerning 
the new charters and, more generally, the future of the ‘autonomic State’ established by the 
Spanish Constitution of 1978.  
Catalonia is by far the wealthiest CA in Spain. Leaving aside other peculiar 
exceptions like the Basque Country, Catalonia’s linguistic identity – based on the Catalan 
language – is quite distinct from that of the rest of Spain, where Castilian is spoken. Claims 
for greater political and, significantly, financial autonomy are strongly linked with the 
resurgence of Catalan identity. According to some scholars, the main reasons for this 
process are legal, financial and cultural. As for the legal side of Catalan claims, the central 
State has been progressively eroding Catalan legislative competencies thanks to its exclusive 
or ‘transversal’ competencies. ‘Identity’ or ‘symbolic’ topics, in turn, have occupied a more 
and more significant role in political debate ‘due to the non-recognition by the Constitution 
of 1978 of the existence of national realities alongside the Spanish one’XII. 
 
3. Factual Background: 1. The Drafting of  the Estatut 
In 2003 a left-wing autonomist coalition took office in Catalonia. One of its main 
electoral pledges was the writing of a fully new Estatuto de autonomía. The drafting of a new 
Estatuto was seen as instrumental both in giving Catalonia a ‘real’ constitution and ‘forcing 
the hand’ of the central State in bilateral negotiations on such sensitive issues as financial 
relations and judicial organisation. Thus, the drafting of the Estatut has been both a 
constitution-making process and a policy-oriented forum, much in the general tradition of 
subnational constitutionalismXIII. In 2004 a new national government presided by J.L. 
Rodríguez Zapatero took office, a national government supposed to be more autonomy-
friendly than its conservative predecessor. The Estatut was approved in 2006 after a 
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difficult debate and the search for a compromise between Catalan nationalist parties, on 
one side, and the State and non-nationalist Catalans, on the other sideXIV. 
 
4. Factual Background: 2. The TC facing the Estatut 
After that, the leading force in the parliamentary opposition in Madrid, the Partido 
Popular (PP) immediately questioned the constitutional legitimacy of the new Catalan 
fundamental charter. The Spanish Constitutional Court finally gave its decision at the end 
of a long-drawn-out deliberation process, during which the very legitimacy of the Tribunal 
was often put into question. 
The PP asked the Court to exclude the President of the TC María Emilia Casas 
Baamonde and Judge Pablo Pérez Tremps from taking part in the decision because they 
had allegedly been involved in different ways in the preparatory works of the Estatut. The 
Generalitat of Catalonia, in turn, did the same with reference to Judges Roberto García-
Calvo y Montiel and Jorge Rodríguez-Zapata Pérez. None of these initial applications was 
successful. However, after a second objection, Judge Pérez Tremps was eventually 
excluded from taking part in the decisionXV. Judge García-Calvo y Montiel died in 2008 and 
has not been replaced yet. 
Four other judges – including the President and the Vice-President of the TC – 
whose term of office had expired could not be replaced until January 2011. All of these 
judges had been elected by the Spanish Senate, where a three-fifths majority is required to 
designate the new constitutional judges. Due to the difficult case which the TC had to deal 
with and the lack of consensus among political parties, the upper house of the Spanish 
Cortes could not comply with its constitutional task. Furthermore, this procedure was partly 
revised after the entry into force of some amendments to Article 16(1) of the ley orgánica 
concernig the TC. Nowadays, CAs may propose candidates for the posts of constitutional 
judge when the Senate – qualified by the Spanish Constitution as ‘chamber of territorial 
representation’ (Art. 69(1)) – has to choose a replacement for a vacant seat. Thus, the Cortes 
have implicitly coped with a Catalan claim which had been written down at Article 180 of 
the EstatutXVI. 
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5. The Judgment 
 From a morphological point of view, this very long sentencia has quite a complex 
structure. It consists of an opinion of the Court, drafted by President María Emilia Casas 
Baamonde and five individual opinions (votos particulares), presented by Judges Vicente 
Conde Martín de Hijas, Javier Delgado Barrio, Eugeni Gay Montalvo, Jorge Rodríguez-
Zapata Pérez, and Ramón Rodríguez Arribas. 
 As for the content of the judgment, only few provisions in the Estatut are 
recognized  as unconstitutional. A greater number of provisions ‘are not unconstitutional, 
insofar as they are construed’ in accordance with what is stated in the judgment. 
 Due to space concerns, this analysis of the judgment cannot look into all the legal 
questions with which the TC has dealt in the opinion of the Court – rather, it will focus on 
the general theoretical premises of its reasoning and the most relevant  complaints 
concerning the Estatut. 
The TC has analyzed the Estatut from a strictly legal perspective, whose 
foundations lie in the distinction between constituent power (poder constituyente) and legally 
established powers (poderes constituidos): the latter are encompassed by the Constitution, 
which also determines their scope and meaningXVII. In other words, Kompetenz-Kompetenz (la 
competencia de la competencia) only belongs to the Constitution, as construed by the case-law of 
the TC. The prominent role of the Tribunal Constitutional in providing authoritative 
interpretations of the Constitution and its provisions concerning fundamental rights or the 
allocation of legislative competencies is insistently stressed in the sentencia. As one of the 
major goals of the Estatut is to provide narrow definitions of the legislative competencies 
of Catalonia (blindaje competencial), the TC recognizes that ‘an Estatuto may grant legislative 
competencies in a given subject-matter, but what these ‘competencies’ entail ... is a matter 
of the Constitution ... As the supreme interpreter of the Constitution, only the Tribunal 
Constitucional is entitled to provide an authoritative – and unquestionable – definition of 
constitutional categories and precepts’XVIII. The provisions of the Estatut concerning the 
allocation of legislative competencies (above all, Articles 110 to 112) are ‘constitutionally 
acceptable insofar as, according to their alleged purpose of describing and accommodating 
the system, they adapt themselves to the normative and dogmatic reconstruction which can 
be drawn from our case-law in any historical moment’XIX. 
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The autonomic charters are subject to the Constitution, as always happens with 
normative acts which are not elaborated by a sovereign powerXX. The foundations and the 
guarantee of the autonomy of Catalonia lie in the Constitution. As the Constitution is the 
fundamental law in the legal system, it cannot allow any other norm to be other than 
hierarchically subject to itself.  
The other necessary premise concerns the contents of an Estatuto de autonomía. Is 
the formal Constitution, as approved in 1978 and subsequently amended, the only possible 
source of constitutional principles and rules in the legal system? The Catalan Generalitat 
argued in its pleading for a substantially constitutional view of Estatutos. In fact, said the 
Court, ‘no legal system lacks legal norms performing functions which, within the normative 
system, are to be qualified as substantially constitutional, since their goals are conceptually 
viewed as intrinsic to the fundamental law of any legal system’. Even conceding that, ‘such 
a qualification has no other scope than a purely doctrinal or academic one’. Although many 
provisions of the Estatutos may have a constitutional flavour, this does not involve a higher 
normative value for them. This distinction is crucial to the understanding of the sentencia 
no. 31/2010, as it allows the TC to ‘weaken’ many ambitious provisions of the TC ‘from 
inside’, without formally declaring that they are constitutionally illegitimate.  
According to some critics, the TC has not upheld its previous statements on the 
nature of Estatutos in Judgment no. 247/2007, concerning the charter of the Valencian 
CommunityXXI. In 2007, the TC had stated that the relation between the Constitution and 
the Estatutos de autonomía is one of subordination as well as mutual integration, since the 
Estatutos are also part of the bloque de constitucionalidad which the TC uses to assess the 
legitimacy of a norm. On that occasion, the TC had also remarked that Estatutos, unlike the 
other kinds of leyes orgánicas, are the result of a complex procedure, in which both the State 
and the Autonomous Community are involved. In 2010, however, the TC argued that the 
Estatut is, in fact, a ley orgánica, whose relations with the Constitution of 1978 are basically 
hierarchical. Moreover, ‘constitutional illegitimacy for violation of an Estatuto is actually a 
violation of the Constitution, the only norm able to grant ... competencies’XXII. 
As Article 147(2) CE states, there is a necessary, ‘core’ content of the Estatutos: 
denomination, territory, institutional organization and competencies of a given 
Autonomous Community. According to the Court, ‘This necessary content may be a 
sufficient content, as well – but the Constitution itself allows to fill the Estatutos with 
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additional contents’XXIII. Thus, the TC clarifies that the Estatutos, which the Constitution 
qualifies as ‘basic institutional norms of the Autonomous Communities’ (Article 147(3)), 
can host additional contents, but they are subordinated to the Constitution and must 
comply with its provisions. Because of the fundamental distinction between constituent 
power and constitutional powers, there are some qualitative limitations, ‘affecting the 
definition of constitutional categories and concepts. Among them, there is the definition of 
the Kompetenz-Kompetenz, which, as an act of sovereignty, is only intrinsic to the 
Constitution. These limitations cannot be trespassed by any legislator and are only within 
the reach of the interpretative task of the Constitutional Court’XXIV. 
As far as substantial questions are concerned, five points are very interesting for the 
purposes of this note. 
First, the Preamble of the Estatuto contains an ambiguous statement: ‘In reflection 
of the feelings and the wishes of the citizens of Catalonia, the Parliament of Catalonia has 
defined Catalonia as a nation by an ample majority. The Spanish Constitution, in its second 
Article, recognises the national reality of Catalonia as a nationality’. According to a well 
established doctrine of the TC, the Preambles in the Estatutos have no normative value but 
only an interpretative one. However, ‘a lack of normative value is no lack of legal value’ – 
therefore, the Court has to deal with these ‘concepts and categories which ... seek to give 
the Estatuto foundations and a scope incompatible with its condition of subordination with 
respect to the Constitution’XXV. As a result of this challenge, the TC stated that the most 
controversial passages of the Preamble had no interpretative value. Whilst a group is 
entitled to call itself a nation for the purposes of political or cultural debate, when it comes 
to legal language there is only one nation in the Kingdom of Spain, the Spanish nation. On 
the contrary, Catalans are just a ‘nationality’ (Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution and 
Article 1(2) of the Catalonian Estatut)XXVI. This argumentation also affects the problem of 
the allocation of sovereignty in Spain: thus, since the Spanish legal system is based on the 
principle of popular sovereignty, the only holder of sovereignty can be the Spanish people 
at large. The judicial treatment of the provisions affecting language rights can be analyzed 
against this framework, as well. Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution allows the 
Autonomous Communities to give their local languages an official status alongside 
Castilian, ‘the official Spanish language of the State’. Thus, the provisions of the Estatut on 
the co-official status of Castilian and Catalan are plainly legitimate. The only 
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unconstitutional norm is that providing for the ‘preferential use [of the Catalan language] in 
Public Administration bodies’ (Article 6(1)), whilst Catalan can indeed be ‘the language of 
normal use for teaching and learning in the education system’ ‘insofar as this does not 
involve the exclusion of Castilian as teaching language’XXVII. The approach of the TC seems 
clear: any norms which may appear a legal contribution to the building up of a Catalan 
nation, if they cannot be interpreted consistently with the Constitution, are illegitimate or 
without legal value. 
Second, as for the legitimising force of Catalan autonomy, the Preamble says that 
‘Catalonia’s self-government is founded on the Constitution, and also on the historical 
rights of the Catalan people, which, in the framework of the Constitution, give rise to 
recognition in this Estatuto of the unique position of the Generalitat’. Again, interpretations 
claiming that the Catalonian autonomy has foundations other than the provisions of the 
Spanish constitution have to be rebutted. The legal foundations of autonomy are the 
constitutional provisions concerning the territorial organisation of the Kingdom of Spain. 
In fact, two CAs, Navarre and the Basque Country, enjoy a privileged financial status due 
to some historical rights (the so-called derechos forales) – these rights, however, are explicitly 
mentioned (and recognised) in the Constitution (Article 149(1)(8)). As the Court stated, 
‘Only in an improper way could these historical rights be intended to be, even legally, the 
foundation of Catalonian self-government, because ... they can only explain the fact that 
Estatutos take up some determined competencies in accordance with the Constitution, but 
they cannot at all explain the foundation of the legal existence of the Autonomous 
Community of Catalonia and its constitutional entitlement to self-government’XXVIII. 
Third, the Estatuto contains a detailed bill of rights. In 2007, the TC had already laid down 
that the provisions of Estatuti concerning rights were not fundamental rights but only 
directive propositions needing ordinary legislation to be implementedXXIX. In 2010 the 
Court held again that ‘To be rigorous, fundamental rights are only those rights which limit 
every legislature, i.e. the Cortes Generales and the legislative assemblies of the Autonomous 
Communities, in order to guarantee freedom and equality. This function of limit can only 
be performed by a superior norm which is common to every legislature, i.e. by the 
Constitution’XXX. In the TC’s view, this assumption is confirmed by Article 37(4) of the 
Estatuto, according to which: 
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‘The rights and principles of this Title shall not imply any alteration to the system for distribution of powers nor the creation of 
new Titles regarding powers nor the modification of those that already exist. None of the provisions of this Title shall be enacted, 
applied or interpreted in any way that reduces or restricts the fundamental rights recognised in the Constitution and in 
international treaties and conventions ratified by Spain’. 
 
Therefore, the global meaning of the Catalan bill of rights is greatly diminished. 
Two other aspects of the judgment are worth recalling. The treatment of the provisions 
concerning the allocation of legislative competencies, the Catalan judiciary and financial 
arrangements is striking. These are perhaps the most ‘political’ provisions in the Estatut, 
aiming at conditioning the national debate on judicial and financial topics towards a 
significant ‘autonomization’ of both of them. In fact, the ley orgánica no. 3/2009, revising 
the LOFCA (Ley orgánica on the financing of Autonomous Communities), has been 
prompted by the ‘last wave’ of Estatutos de autonomíaXXXI. Most of the provisions of the 
Estatut concerning those subjects have not been condemned by the TC as illegitimate 
because those provisions are ultimately not able to regulate them – the Constitution says 
that a ley orgánica, stemming from the State legislature, is necessary. Thus, many provisions 
of the Estatut are not properly preceptive statements – rather, they express some political 
claims of the Catalan Generalitat. 
As far as financial arrangements are concerned, it is worth pointing out that Catalan 
attempts at providing a unilateral (re-)definition of the financial regime of the Autonomous 
Community fatally clash with the fundamental role of the State in this domainXXXII. This is 
a very interesting point, which also illuminates a distinctive feature of contemporary fiscal 
federalism in most jurisdictions around the world. 
As for judicial and constitutional review, the Court makes a fundamental point: ‘it is 
self-evident ... that one of the defining traits of the autonomic State, insofar as it is different 
from the federal State, is that its functional and organic pluralism does not affect the 
judiciary at all. In the autonomic State, the diversification of the legal system, resulting in 
more autonomous normative systems, does not take place at the constitutional level – 
entailing the existence of more constitutions ... Conversely, it only starts at the level of 
ordinary laws, in presence of one national constitution’XXXIII. Thus, even if the practical 
operation of the Spanish federalizing process has gone well beyond a mere autonomic 
frame, the traditional scholarly distinction between federal systems and autonomous (or 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   N -   
 
11 
regional) ones is still relevant to the self-understanding of the systemXXXIV. In the light of 
these considerations, the deliberations of the Consell de Garanties Estatutàries (Council for 
Statutory Guarantees) cannot bind the legislature – the Consell cannot aim at becoming a 
sort of Constitutional Court of CataloniaXXXV. Since the Spanish legal system has just one 
Constitution, there can be only one Constitutional Court. Correspondingly, the provisions 
of the Estatut concerning the High Court of Justice of Catalonia and the Council of Justice 
of Catalonia are not illegitimate ‘insofar as’ those organs can be viewed as decentralized 
branches of the (unitary) state judicial systems. 
 
6. Assessing the Judgment 
Sentencia no. 31/2010 is clearly the result of a compromise between very different 
states of mind within the Tribunal Constitucional. Whereas some judges aimed at declaring 
the full illegitimacy of the Estatut, others were reluctant to be too aggressive towards it, 
fearing a dangerous overinvolvement of the TC in political questions. However, this 
compromise has undergone widespread criticism. The magnitude of the conflict is 
witnessed e.g. by the dissenting opinion of Judge Jorge Rodríguez-Zapata Pérez: 
 
‘The Estatut takes the place of the constituent legislator and modifies the Constitution without conforming to the [constitutional] 
procedures; it incurs in a colossal flaw of incompetency overthrowing the division of power between the State and the Autonomous 
Communities in every domain; it harms the human dignity of all Spaniards affecting their rights, above all their right ... to use in 
Spain the Spanish official language of the State; lastly, it upsets the constitutional system of sources of law and, at the same time, 
the operation of the State itself’. 
 
Some commentators have stressed the particular significance of this judgment in 
defining the role of the TC within the Spanish legal system. The TC is a constitutional 
power (poder constituido), too. Still, it tends to behave like a commissary of the constituent 
power (comisario del poder constituyente), as Eduardo García de Enterría once suggestedXXXVI. 
Others have argued that the judgment reveals a lack of deference by the TC towards the 
complex legislator entrusted with enacting Estatutos de autonomía – a complex procedure in 
which the Catalan Parliament, the national Cortes Generales and the people of Catalonia had 
taken partXXXVII. 
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In fact, the TC seems to have paid dearly for its attempt at ‘rescuing’ many 
provisions of the Estatut by means of interpretation “consistent with the Constitution.”. 
One scholar argued that the TC might not have been exercising its power within the scope 
of constitutional review, ‘i.e., with the highest deference towards the legislative’XXXVIII. 
This criticism cannot be entirely rejected. The TC tried to stop a serious political 
conflict, whose magnitude is reflected by the contestations over the fitness of many 
members of the TC itself to deal with the case. However, in overemphasizing its monopoly 
of constitutional interpretation it adopted a questionable strategy. Whereas many 
provisions of the Estatuto dynamically reflect ‘hard’ constitutional and political debates – 
concerning e.g. the Catalan identity, language rights, or financial resources – the TC has 
tried to provide a solid, basically stable interpretation of those norms. It has searched for a 
viable compromise, so as to avoid a serious clash with the State or Catalonia. By doing so, 
however, it has perhaps invaded an area where political negotiations between institutional 
levels should hold sway. The hard political conflict before the final approval of the Estatut 
could hardly be solved by a constitutional court, whose chief mission is to evaluate the 
constitutional – neither historical, nor political – legitimacy of legal norms. Furthermore, the 
conflict might have only been postponed. Even if the Preamble of the Estatut has no legal 
value and its ‘bill of rights’ merely contains ‘directive norms’, they could form the basis for 
regional legislation which could clash with the Spanish Constitution. Thus, the ‘basic 
institutional norm’ of Catalonia continues containing a latent source of possible legal 
conflicts. 
 In conclusion, the TC faced a serious challenge between 2006 and 2010, whose 
solution has led some scholars and a part of the public to question its very legitimacy. Only 
in the long run, however, can the sustainability of its hard-fought sentencia be verified.   
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